Another step out of Russia

By Nina Bachkatov

President Zelensky hailed as “historic” the cessation of Russian gas exports through Ukraine on January 1. The five-year transit contract, signed at the end of 2019, had been maintained even after Russia’s invasion, as Ukraine sought to “demonstrate its reliability as a partner to Europe”. On 19st December 2024, President Zelensky confirmed that the contract would not be renewed, stating it was a move aimed at undermining Russia’s war effort. However, he said little about the potential economic consequences for Ukraine, including the loss of transit fees, the inability to siphon deliveries en route to the EU as in the past, and the heightened risk of Russian attacks on pipeline infrastructure. He also categorically ruled out transporting Russian gas disguised as Azerbaijani via Ukrainian pipelines.

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Another gas crisis between Russia and Moldova

By Nina Bachkatov 

The latest “gas crisis” between Russia’s and Moldova’s energy companies has offered a good opportunity to measure the evolution of Moscow’s energy diplomacy. The formulation of the final agreement, published after days of bilateral discussions, says a lot. It speaks of an agreement “meeting the interests of both Russia and Moldova” and “showing to Europe and the entire world that Gazprom can come to terms and offer mutually beneficial conditions to its partners”.  In short, better with us that against us. 

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Nord Stream 2 future settled in Washington

For years, Kiev had perceived the internationalisation of its energy issues as the ultimate means to keep Ukrainian economic and national projects safely away from Moscow influence. Lately, all its efforts have been centered on preventing the construction, then the exploitation, of Nord Stream 2, the 1.200 km gas pipeline which, in a few months, will export Russian gas directly to Germany, circumventing Poland and Ukraine. Ukraine has felt over-confident that the strong Western backing should suffice to sink Gazprom chances and the Kremlin ambitions. In fact, doing so, successive Ukrainian presidents have turned their country into a pawn between Moscow, Washington, Brussels, and different EU members ‘states. At their risks and perils.

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