By Nina Bachkatov
With all attention focused on Ukraine, peace has discreetly made a step forward in South Caucasus. On 13 March, Azerbaijan and Armenia confirmed they had “completed the text of a peace agreement” which would end, if fully implemented, a conflict dating back to the late Soviet period. Episodes of this tragic relation include the unilateral declaration of independence by the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh in 1988; a first war resulting in Azerbaijani defeat and the expulsion of Azeris from Karabakh, and years of intermittent violence. In September 2020, having rebuilt his military capabilities thanks to energy revenues, President Aliyev launched the Second Karabakh War. After months of unequal fighting and a total blockade of the population, his army regained control of the breakaway region and re-established Azerbaijan’s entire Soviet-era frontier with Armenia. Some 120,000 Armenians fled a region they consider the cradle of Armenia.
Now, Armenia and Azerbaijan have reached a peace agreement – but they have yet to sign a final one. This means resolving the last two outstanding issues from the 17 discussed. These include the presence of foreign forces on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border and the withdrawal of reciprocal lawsuits filed with international courts. More crucially, Baku has made its ratification of a definitive peace agreement conditional on Armenia amending its constitution to remove any reference to Karabakh, providing compensation for damage inflicted on Azerbaijani territories, and dissolving the OSCE Minsk Group. Baku also demands an unimpeded connection with Nakhichevan, an Azeri enclave along the Iranian border. Less than 24 hours after the joint announcement, both countries began accusing each other of violating the truce.
Internal Imbalance
Baku’s assertiveness reflects both military superiority and internal political stability. Now freed from the political influence of an opposition advocating for the expelled Azeris from Karabakh, President Aliyev enjoys near-unanimous support.
The situation of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is starkly different. The opposition speaks of betrayal, and crowds have taken to the streets demanding his government’s resignation. Even his allies have pointed out the obvious – that the peace agreement is not between equals but between one party facing daily military threats. Critics denounce “unilateral concessions” in exchange for a document that fails to clarify the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, ensure the withdrawal of Azerbaijani forces from Armenian border territories, or prevent further aggression by Azerbaijan.
Armenians also fear the consequences of dissolving the OSCE Minsk Group and the fate of Karabakh prisoners held in Azerbaijan. Their concerns were vindicated when protests erupted over images of the former head of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, Ruben Vardanyan, appearing frail and emaciated on his way to trial, where he and 22 others are accused of “terrorism and war crimes.” Arrested in 2023, Vardanyan had begun a hunger strike to protest his detention.
External Factors
If the significance of an agreement is measured by the number of parties claiming credit, then the 13 March deal is important. It has certainly gained prominence against the backdrop of wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, which have provided Aliyev with an opportunity to strike a deal. Unlike Armenia and many other war-affected nations, Azerbaijan has the financial resources to rebuild the formerly “occupied territories.” Between 2021 and 2024, $10.6bn was allocated for reconstruction; $3.1bn was budgeted for 2024, with a further $2.3bn planned for 2025. This contrasts starkly with impoverished Armenia, whose foreign minister defended the agreement in parliament by stating that “peace and normalisation of relations with Azerbaijan is the only way for Armenia’s survival.”
The list of those welcoming signs of “stabilisation in the South Caucasus” is extensive. It includes leaders of former Soviet republics, who see this agreement as proof that conflicts in the former Soviet space can be resolved bilaterally after trilateral meetings under Russian mediation. Turkey and Iran also support the deal, albeit for different reasons, and despite disagreements over another contentious issue between Yerevan and Baku: the so-called Zangazur Corridor. This is yet another Soviet-era legacy, where administrative borders have been recognised as international state borders. The “corridor,” a concept promoted by Azerbaijan and Turkey, would connect Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan enclave through Armenia’s Syunik province. Iran and Moscow back it as a way to restore transport links severed by the mutual blockade of 1989. However, Armenia insists that “reconnection” should be limited to the railway line, not a full-fledged corridor without Armenian checkpoints. Azerbaijan has hinted that it is prepared to enforce its demands by force should Armenia refuse.
There is a general sense in the region that now is the right time to act, given the West’s perceived fickleness and Moscow’s preoccupation with Ukraine. As one observer put it: “The issue should be resolved before Russia comes to its senses” – and before the West can claim a share of the victory as peacemaker.