Russia Focuses on the East

by Nina Bachkatov

Russia’s pivot to the East has been quiet yet telling, reflecting its vision of the West chasing Moscow’s influence across the globe. On 17 April, in a closed session, Russia’s Supreme Court temporarily lifted the ban on the Afghan Taliban’s activities within Russia, revoking their 2003 designation as a terrorist organisation. The decision was first communicated in Kabul by Russia’s ambassador to Afghanistan, Dmitry Zhirnov, to the Taliban’s Foreign Minister. Five days later, Russia’s special envoy for Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, travelled to Kabul for a “special meeting” aimed at “removing hurdles”. The Taliban had first visited Moscow in an official capacity in November 2018, though informal channels—often involving Soviet and Afghan veterans—had remained open beforehand.

Presented in Kabul as a “historic step”, this development concludes years of strategic ambiguity between Russia and Afghanistan, spanning from the Soviet Union’s collapse to the tumultuous civil wars. It also aligns with President Putin’s address to the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok in September 2021, where he asserted his determination to pivot away from Europe towards Asia. Regarding Afghanistan, he stated: “Russia is not interested in a disintegrated Afghanistan,” but “the reality today is that the Taliban control practically all of Afghan territory… If that is so, we must proceed from this reality… It will be easier to communicate with them.” In 2025, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov underlined that “Russia considers the Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan a reality that other countries must accept if they wish to pursue a pragmatic rather than ideologically-driven policy.”

Global Rivalry

In 2021, President Putin viewed Afghanistan’s stabilisation and national reconciliation as contingent upon cooperative external forces. By 2025, however, he sees the West as “actively attempting” to reassert influence in Afghanistan, much as it does elsewhere globally. Recently, Sergei Naryshkin, head of Russia’s foreign intelligence service (SVR), accused Western intelligence agencies of seeking to destabilise the Taliban government to advance their own geopolitical aims. Lavrov similarly criticised the continued freezing of Afghan assets and the maintenance of sanctions.

Yet Russia’s warming towards the Taliban also reflects rising tensions on its southern flank, particularly following a recent terrorist attack in Kashmir, which threatens to unravel decades of agreements between Pakistan and India. For Moscow, Afghanistan is but one node in a wider strategic network stretching from the Caspian Sea and Iran to the Indian Ocean—regions where the West is increasingly seen as a hostile force.

Regional Stability

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin has feared spillovers of Islamic extremism and illicit trafficking from Afghanistan that could destabilise the five Central Asian republics—and Russia itself. Today, the situation is markedly different. Ironically, Russia’s war in Ukraine has prompted the five Central Asian states to strengthen their cooperation, both bilaterally and within post-Soviet structures of the CIS. Their collaboration now extends beyond old disputes, such as over water resources, to the development of joint infrastructure projects.

While maintaining a “multi-vector” foreign policy, these nations increasingly see Moscow as a known and manageable partner. Investments from across the globe continue to flow into Central Asia, even as the region remains caught between Russian and Chinese ambitions—and risks importing conflicts from the South, including the Iran-Turkey rivalry. Moscow’s recognition of the Taliban is seen as a stabilising move, particularly given the Taliban’s active fight against the greater threat of ISIS. Improved relations with Kabul, spearheaded by Moscow, are also expected to facilitate new trade routes and opportunities.

Economic Calculations

Russian officials acknowledge that the decision to delist the Taliban may appear puzzling to many, hence their emphasis on the economic rationale. Russian companies are expanding their footprint in Central Asia, alongside non-Russian actors, and increasingly Afghanistan is seen as an opportunity rather than a risk. Access to its natural resources and energy market—coveted by many—is a key part of Russia’s longer-term strategy to enhance trade links with Pakistan and Iran, up to their ports, particularly as access to European markets remains severely curtailed.

The Afghan Foreign Minister’s statement that talks focused on “raising the level of relations between Afghanistan and Russia, expanding economic and trade ties, and addressing regional issues” underscores this pragmatic agenda. Notably, Kabulov announced that a “special meeting” would take place on the sidelines of the Kazan Economic Forum in May 2025, marking the formal launch of the “Afghanistan–Russia Permanent Bilateral Commission.”

Caution Remains

Despite these developments, Russian officials remain cautious. The Supreme Court’s decision to lift the ban was explicitly framed as “temporary”, leaving room to reverse course if the Taliban are perceived to act duplicitously or fail to function as a constructive political force. Lavrov reiterated this point during his visit to Uzbekistan on 23 April, stressing that Russia remains committed to participating in the UN-led Doha consultations “so long as the participation of Western countries is honest and does not conceal ulterior motives.” Moscow also advocates the unfreezing of Afghanistan’s state reserves held in the United States and the lifting of sanctions to alleviate the country’s acute socio-economic crisis.

Nonetheless, commentators in Russia and within Afghan exile opposition movements have pointed out two significant weaknesses: first, Russia’s influence in Afghanistan remains limited compared to that of China, the US, Iran, Pakistan, and increasingly the Gulf states; second, Moscow’s “cynical manoeuvring”—securing its southern flank while eyeing Afghanistan’s mineral wealth—is predicated on the still unproven assumption that the Taliban, who have renounced terrorist practices since 2021 are genuinely combatting ISIS, which continues to perpetrate bloody attacks across the region and beyond.

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