By Nina Bachkatov
On 20 October, Moldova will hold its presidential election, followed by parliamentary elections in Georgia on 25 October. In ordinary times, these events would likely pass with limited interest from voters and even less from the international community. But in 2024, the war in Ukraine looms over every development in the former Soviet space, casting these elections in the light of relations between Russia and the West. In both countries, the electoral contest is framed as a choice between “pro-European” factions seeking to distance themselves from Moscow’s influence and “pro-Russian” parties aligning with the Kremlin. This is particularly the case in Moldova, where the pro-EU government led by President Maia Sandu has coupled the presidential election with a referendum on whether to enshrine EU membership in the Constitution.
Both Tbilisi and Chisinau have witnessed weeks of protests ahead of the polls, with demonstrators alleging electoral manipulation and fraud. These local events resonate internationally, as Moldova and Georgia are home to three of the four “frozen conflicts” that emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union: South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, and Transnistria in Moldova. The fourth, Nagorno-Karabakh, remains in political limbo following the forced expulsion of Armenians by Azerbaijani forces a year ago.
Remarkably, there was a time when resolving these “frozen conflicts” was seen as a potential area of EU-Russian cooperation, along with energy partnerships. The current Western narrative, strengthened by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, portrays Moscow as having deliberately fueled these conflicts to prevent Chisinau and Tbilisi from pursuing independent foreign policies and democratic governance. The Kremlin’s counter-narrative is that Russian intervention prevented civil wars and protected the rights of minorities.
Historical Parallels
These frozen conflicts all began in the waning days of the Soviet Union, when nationalist “Popular Fronts” entered parliaments after the 1989 abolition of Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution, which ended the Communist Party’s monopoly on power. As the USSR disintegrated, ethnic minorities moved to establish their own “autonomies”, and the absence of national armies led to Russian “peacekeepers” being seen as a lesser evil than outright civil war. Even in the West, that were concerned the risk of a Yugoslav-style collapse. Amid the broader reforms and growing rivalry between Russia and the West, successive attempts to settle these conflicts were thwarted. While the Soviet Kremlin did not create these disputes, the Russian state increasingly instrumentalised them, using them as diplomatic leverage.
Several key similarities unite these conflicts:
- Cultural and linguistic factors played a central role in their emergence. In Abkhazia, protests in 1988-1989 against the “Georgianisation” of Sukhumi university ignited tensions. South Ossetians revolted in December 1990 when Georgia’s parliament revoked their autonomous status. In Moldova, the push for independence was driven by opposition to the Moldovan Popular Front’s moves to re-establish links with Romania, adopt the Latin alphabet, and make Moldovan the sole official language. This led to unilateral declarations of independence in Transnistria and by the Gagauz, who sought to preserve Russian as a lingua franca for their multi-ethnic community.
- Power structures in the secessionist regions have developed over time, with regular elections, their own passports, flags, and institutions. Despite this, no country recognises their independence, even not Russia, except other breakaway regions.
- Economic ties with Russia underpin these regions’ survival, with Moscow providing cheap energy, subsidies, and trade preferences. While some inherited strong industries and tourism from Soviet times, frustration over the growing dominance of Russian investors is starting to surface, particularly in Abkhazia, where it fuels opposition in parliament.
The ongoing war in Ukraine has further complicated relations between Moscow, the national capitals, and the secessionist regions. There are genuine concerns that Russia could use these regions as a springboard for further military action, as it did with Crimea and Donbas. Meanwhile, the value of Russian ties and passports has diminished under the weight of Western sanctions.
Diverging Dynamics
Despite their shared history, Moldova and Georgia face different electoral and geopolitical challenges:
- Election focus: In Moldova, attention is largely on the referendum tied to the presidential vote. In response, Transnistrian authorities announced their own referendum, which Chisinau has declared illegal. In Georgia, the election is parliamentary, pitting the ruling Georgian Dream party against the opposition, backed by President Salome Zurabishvili. The contest is seen as a direct clash between pro-EU and pro-Russian forces, with potential protests on the streets of Tbilisi. No such upheaval is expected in Chisinau.
- Geopolitical positioning: Georgia, located in the South Caucasus, has no land borders with the EU and is surrounded by powerful regional players—Russia, Iran, and Turkey. The ongoing situation in Nagorno-Karabakh adds to its complexities. Moldova, in contrast, is firmly within continental Europe, geographically close to Romania but seeking to maintain its distinct identity while edging towards EU membership.
- Impact of the war in Ukraine: The conflict has transformed Transnistria into an enclave between Ukraine and Moldova, both of which are EU and NATO candidates. Ukraine’s decision to close the border has strained Transnistria’s economy, while Chisinau has increased taxes on goods from the region and severed energy ties. By contrast, Georgia has seen an influx of Russian war opponents who view it as a relatively convenient refuge, close to home, speaking Russian, though their presence has sparked resentment over rising rents and social pressures.
- Ethnic composition: Georgia, like neighbouring Armenia, has a homogenous population with a deep sense of national pride, leaving ethnic minorities feeling vulnerable. Moldova, by contrast, is more ethnically diverse, with tensions between those asserting Moldovan identity and those with Russian ties. These divisions extend to religious affiliations, with rivalries between the Moscow and Bucharest Patriarchates, and concerns over Moscow’s use of the Orthodox Church as a tool in a hybrid war. Turkey also monitors Moldova’s small Muslim population with interest.
The EU’s Role
In this complex landscape, the EU’s role is increasingly pivotal. Economically, the bloc appears well-positioned to replace Russia, offering internationally recognised passports and visa access to people in the secessionist regions. This is more challenging in Georgia, where Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili has campaigned on the country’s economic growth, which benefits from diversified trade relations, including with Russia.
Nonetheless, EU financial support can make a significant difference in these small nations. This was underscored by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s visit to Moldova just 10 days before the election, where she announced a €1.8 billion aid package—equivalent to a third of the country’s national budget.
Yet beyond economics, the EU’s mission is to promote democratic values, including minority rights. Navigating these post-electoral landscapes will require patience, creativity, and a deep understanding of the region’s intricate dynamics.