INSIDE RUSSIA AND EURASIA – On-line Intelligence Bulletin of the European Press Agency

Baku: More than Climate in Play

By Nina Bachkatov

On 11 November, COP29, the UN Climate Change Conference, commenced in Baku, scheduled to run through the 29th. While the official theme is climate finance, geopolitics has loomed large over the agenda well before the conference’s opening day. First, “climate finance” implies substantial investment from developed nations to support decarbonization in developing economies—an approach that is far from universally popular. Second, the conference begins just one week after the election of a notably climate-skeptic Donald Trump. Third, the choice of Baku—a city synonymous with energy wealth but lacking in democratic credentials—has raised questions. Finally, various delegates are under pressure to promote specific stances on global issues.

Cross-Message From Kazan

By Nina Bachkatov

Despite being previously dismissed as a low-key exercise, the 2024 BRICS Summit in Kazan attracted significant international attention. This year’s gathering took place amid a tense geopolitical backdrop: Israel’s actions in Iran, North Korean soldiers arriving in Russia’s Far East en route to the Ukrainian front, and uncertainty surrounding UN Secretary-General Guterres’ response to his invitation.

The BRICS coalition was launched in 2009 by Brazil, Russia, India, and China, later adding South Africa in 2010. Ethiopia, Iran, Egypt, and the UAE joined at last year’s summit, while Belarus gained partner status this year. In total, 32 countries were represented, two-thirds by their heads of state, including NATO member Turkey, represented by President Erdogan. Brazil’s president was absent due to health concerns.

EU Eyes Moldova and Georgia

By Nina Bachkatov

On 20 October, Moldova will hold its presidential election, followed by parliamentary elections in Georgia on 25 October. In ordinary times, these events would likely pass with limited interest from voters and even less from the international community. But in 2024, the war in Ukraine looms over every development in the former Soviet space, casting these elections in the light of relations between Russia and the West. In both countries, the electoral contest is framed as a choice between “pro-European” factions seeking to distance themselves from Moscow’s influence and “pro-Russian” parties aligning with the Kremlin. This is particularly the case in Moldova, where the pro-EU government led by President Maia Sandu has coupled the presidential election with a referendum on whether to enshrine EU membership in the Constitution.

Zelensky’s Diplomatic Offensive in the U.S.

By Nina Bachkatov

On 18 September, President Volodymyr Zelensky unveiled a “fully prepared” Victory Plan, marking his second political gamble in as many weeks. The first was the unexpected cross-border attack on Russia’s Kursk region, which reportedly caught even senior Ukrainian officials by surprise. This 10-point Victory Plan, more radical and uncompromising than the 4-point Peace Plan presented in February, adopts a “take it or leave it” approach towards Ukraine’s allies. Its contents will be “discussed” during a meeting with President Biden on 26 September, the focal point of Zelensky’s five-day tour of the United States.

A disconcerting war summer

By Nina Bachkatov

July and August were anything but uneventful in the ongoing war between Ukraine and Russia. The summer began poorly for Ukraine, yet by the end of August, Russian citizens were witnessing their refineries ablaze as far east as Omsk, while 120,000 people were evacuated from the Kursk region. Despite these setbacks, Russia’s advance in the Donbas continued, accompanied by relentless waves of missile and drone attacks on Ukraine, leaving entire regions without electricity for much of the day. In this fraught context, President Zelensky’s plan for a second Peace Conference in November has come under scrutiny. Initially envisioned to include a Russian delegation and representatives of the “Global South,” the feasibility of the conference now seems uncertain. Meanwhile, President Putin remains steadfast in portraying Russia as under attack by Ukrainian terrorists backed by NATO, cyclically emphasising Russia’s status as a nuclear superpower.

Even the optimists now fear that the cycle of destruction and death will persist, fueled by a growing thirst for revenge in both Ukrainian and Russian societies. Rationality appears only one part of the equation when considering the non-exhaustive list of this summer’s developments.

Ukraine’s holistic reconstruction

By Nina Bachkatov

As the war prolongs far beyond initial expectations, Ukraine’s reconstruction has become a prominent topic on the agendas of international meetings and summits. The Berlin Conference on Ukraine, held on June 11-12, was noteworthy not only because it coincided with a G7 meeting and an EU summit that confirmed Ukraine’s readiness to begin accession negotiations. The conference saw participation from a diverse array of stakeholders, including governments, international organisations, financial institutions, businesses, regions, municipalities, think tanks, and NGOs, all agreeing to collaborate towards the reconstruction of a free, democratic, and economically vibrant Ukraine. This marks a significant shift from the focus on military assistance, humanitarian aid, and political support against Russia that has dominated discussions since 2022.

Lucerne: Zelensky’s diplomatic challenge

By Nina Bachkatov

A “Peace Summit” in Ukraine will be held in Switzerland on June 15-16, following a request made by President Zelensky in January. The Ukrainian president expects participants to discuss the 10-point peace plan he presented to President Biden in December 2022, and subsequently to the G7, G20, and other international organisations, when the military situation was more favorable. Now, with the expectation that the war might extend to 2025 or beyond, this meeting poses a significant diplomatic challenge for Zelensky. He envisions a global pro-Ukrainian, anti-Russian bloc, including not only Western allies but also states that have so far maintained an ambiguous neutrality.

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